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Preface 
THE GOOD SOCIETY AND THE COMPLEXITY OF 
THE STRUCTURE OF MORALITY 
by 
Hector-Neri Castaneda 
In this paper I have two main purposes: (i) to outline the most general 
structure of morality, which is the fundamental schema of a good society, and 
(ii) to indict most of the main stream views in the history of moral philosophy 
for their unchecked tendency to reductionism and oversimplification. The 
tendency to oversimplification appears both in the gathering of the data for 
philosophical theorizing and in the theorizing itself. I will also point out 
another major recurring error in moral philosophy. I envision the day when 
moral philosophers, after examining their ontological and their methodological 
assumptions, rally to the banner of anti-reductionism and complexification. 
Since reductionism and oversimplification are also widespread throughout the 
the.ory of the foundations of social sciences, this particular battle may, hope­
fully, provide also a worthwhile spectacle for the social scientists in this audience. 
1. The Good Society 
A good society is a moral society. 
Obviously, a moral society ls one that somehow and to some significant 
degree embodies the institution of morality. But what is morality? This is the 
crucial question. I will not deal here with the other two questions: "How does a 
society embody or adopt the institution of morality?" and "What degrees of 
embodiment are significant?" Clearly, the embodiment takes place through the 
morality of the individuals' actions and the fairness of their institutions. But to 
elucidate these we need the foundation provided by the answer to the first 
question And this answer will by itself be too large for us here. 
2. A Classical Error in Moral Philosophy 
What exactly is morality? This is a difficult question. It is usually made more 
difficult by the natural assumption that an answer to it must yield an answer to 
the question "Why should one be moral?" This conflative assumption has been 
one of the major sources of error throughout the history of moral philosophy. 
It appears in Plato's idea that just action is profitable; in Kant's conception of 
respect for the moral law and his view of moral autonomy; in Prichard 's concept 
of moral obligation as being itself a motive for action; in the views of contempo­
rary philosophers who tend to identify a moral duty with an overriding or with 
an important duty; in those views that include the thesis that the principles of 
moral obligation or moral rightness must be self-justifying. Perhaps the most 
serious error that originates in that conflative assumption is the confusion of the 
nature of morality with the nature of practical thinking in general. 
I do not propose to discuss this error here. I have discussed it to my satis-
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faction in some other places.1 And I have also provided a system of theories 
that both distinguishes from each other and relates to each other the structure of 
practical thinking in general and the structure of moral practical thinking. 2 
3. Another Classical Error: Oversimplification and Reductionism 
Here I want to denounce another major error that also permeates the history 
of moral philosophy. 'This error has some contacts with the previous one, but 
it is an independent major error in its own right. It is the error of oversimpli­
fication and reductionism. Most moral philosophers have explicitly adopted the 
view that the whole of morality can be derived from, or reduced to, or somehow 
grounded sufficiently on, some simple or not very complex feature like the 
following: 
(i) overridingness-a moral principle being one that defeats any other 
principle of action with which it conflicts; 
(ii) importance-a moral problem being one which (a) the agent, or (b) a 
certain set of people, considers as of utmost importance, and moral rules being 
those that provide solutions to such problems; 
(iii) universalizability-a moral duty being one that the ag�nt [or a critic?] 
recognizing it takes it to be an instance of a general principle in whose 
formulation there are no proper names or any other singular-referring 
expressions; 
(iv) lawlike universality-a moral duty is one which is determined by a general 
proposition that the agent can will to be a universal law of nature; 
(v) the greatest happiness of the greatest number-a moral duty being an 
action that would bring about the greatest happiness for the greate.st number; 
(vi) the greatest (net) utility-a moral duty being an action that has the 
greatest product of moral or intrinsic value and probability of producing such 
value. 
A symptom of the reductionistic assumption is the assumption that there is 
some non-disjunctive condition that is at once both necessary and sufficient for 
moral obligatoriness. On the reductionistic assumption, there is some non­
disjunctive condition C such that the lone moral principle of duty is of the form: 
"Everybody ought morally �o do an action A if and . only if he/she is in con­
dition C." A look at morality reveals that there is no such main principle of 
morality. At any rate, sound methodology requires that we start the investi­
gation with an open mind to reality, not fettered by the idea that there is just 
one simple condition that is both necessary and sufficient for moral duties. 
A historical note is fair at this point. Philosophers like H. A Prichard, who 
have insisted that moral obligations differ qua their obligatoriness, and, like 
David Ross, who have held that there are many irreducible principles of prima 
facie moral duty, have been better observers of morality than most moral 
philosophers. As you may remember, Ross was severely criticized for the 
complexity of his view, indeed, for not having reduced his "heap of duties" to 
one principle ! 
Ross was of course right: morality is complex. In fact, morality is much 
more complex than Ross thought. As we shall see, all of the principles Ross 
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mentions as formulating moral duties are only one segment of the total 
institution of morality. Morality is an extremely complex super-institution that 
both joins together the different members of, as well as the different institutions 
of, a community, and guides the development and the criticism of the 
community. 
Let us take a proto-philosophical look at what morality as an ongoing 
institution does or is supposed to do for a community and for the whole of 
humanity, not to theorize yet, but only to fasten to some striking aspects of 
morality, however vague they may be at this stage. Such aspects must be used 
both as data for theorization and as criteria of adequacy for any proposed 
theory of the nature of morality. 
Morality, or social morality, if you wish, thus avoiding a dilatory verbal dis­
pute, is a system of values and of principles of action, valid for all human beings 
and all those beings who have the power to make plans and decisions, and in­
volves all those entities that possess the capacity for suffering. Clearly morality 
has to include an array of very general and imposing assumptions about the 
nature of thinking agents, whether human or not. It starts with the idea of a 
domain of agents closed by causality, that is, a domain of agents linked by 
criss-crossing causal relationships such that each agent affects another agent and 
each one is affected by someone else in the domain. The ovule idea of morality 
is the ideal of all members of a causally closed domain of agents acting so as to 
attain a maximal happiness, or self-realization, consistent with a maximal 
happiness of each of the other agents of the domain. But this is only the ovule 
ideal. 'This ovule has to be fer;.tilized by several crucial assumptions about 
natural agents in order to develop into the institution or morality as we know 
it. That ovule ideal does not, for one thing, include much of social organization. 
That undeveloped ideal could be satisfied by a society of angels living in an 
angelic environment. By an angel I mean here a being all of whose interests are, 
not only internally harmonious with each other, but are also totally harmonious 
with the interests of all of the other members of the society. An angelic 
environment is one that never frustrates the interests of any agent living, or 
existing, in it. But morality as we conceive it in our attribution of moral 
duties and moral problems, to ourselves and to others, is a more complex ideal 
that takes into account the threefold non-angelic nature of the natural societies 
that have developed on this planet: (i) our natural societies of human beings 
live in environments that are unfriendly or at least very cantankerous; (ii) all 
human beings have interests that conflict with the interests of many others; and 
(iii) many of the interests of every human being conflict with many other inter­
ests of his own. Furthermore, (iv) all human beings have a very limited capacity 
for benevolence and tolerance; (v) each one of them knows little about the 
consequences of his actions; and (vi) most of them are unable to engage in 
detailed or abstract thinking for very long periods. Thus, the institution of 
morality that can apply to natural societies of such creatures as us has to con­
sist not only of the outline of an unreachable ideal of social organization, but 
also of a series of principles that can bring some part of the ideal down to earth­
to be tried and trampled perhaps by us as we live our competitive lives full of 
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jealousies and petty goals; to be misunderstood by our ignorance, our inattention 
and our finite powers of thinking and of loving; but also to be enjoyed and 
approached asymptotically as we, or many among us, gain control of their 
powers of action and either come to believe that decency is to their advantage 
or grow in sympathy toward their fellow human beings. (I for the life of me 
cannot see how the complex structure of morality that involves at its very core 
not only the formulation of an unreachable ideal but also the unavoidable 
collision between that ideal and its application, can be reduced to some of the 
simple features I mentioned before). 
Yet morality is more complex. Morality deals not only with the private or 
direct relationships between agents in a causally closed domain as above 
characterized. It recognizes the significance for the lives of the agents of a given 
closed domain, b'oth of the general partition of the agents in societies or 
communities and of the many groupings of the agents within each society in 
institutions of different sorts. Morality, thus, is a super-institution that pre­
scribes a series of duties in our direct, or private dealings with other agents, 
regardless of institutional or societal links, just by virtue of being members of 
the same closed causal domain, or by virtue of being within a certain causal 
vicinity of each other. But it also prescribes duties to comply with the rules of 
the institutions one belongs to. In this institutional dimension, morality deals 
with the possible conflicts between institutional duties among themselves. But 
morality also concerns itself with the possible conflicts between its own demands 
along its direct or private dimension and its demands along its institutional 
dimension. (.Again, I ask you whether you can with a clear conscience assume 
without more ado that these two additional levels of complexity can be 
derived from, or reduced to, some such simple feature like universalizability, 
or importance for one agent or more, or expected utility.) 
There is still more complexity to be reckoned with. Morality demands that 
the outline of the ideal be glimpsed steadily or often. Morality demands a steady 
watch on the degree of conformity of the social structure, the institutional setup, 
and the individual networks of private moral duties, to the envisagable outline of 
an ideal society. Morality demands not only the revamping of institutions and the 
reshaping of the individual motivational nature, but it also demands sometimes 
a revolution in the very oonception of morality that has pervaded a certain soci­
ety. Morality demands, sometimes, that some agents engage in attempting deep 
moral progress. This deep progress hits at the roots of the well established 
assumptions of a society that have been grounds for the establishment, and the 
criticism, of institutions and for the formulation of direct interpersonal 
obligations; it is a progress involving the alteration of the moral code itself, so as 
to bring the society in question one step closer to the unreachable ideal. 
In short, morality is a super-institution that involves several layers of demands, 
and involves the possibility of conflicts even within its own layers, and involves 
the principles for the solution of such conflicts. Isn't it patent that no simple 
feature like universalizability, importance, overridingness, the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number, the greatest expected utility, or the greatest probabil­
ity of this .or that, can be assumed to be able to account for all those levels of 
complexity in the structure of morality? 
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4. Some Criteria of Adequacy for Any Theory of Morality 
The preceding observations on the multiple roles of mo,rality and its many 
tiers makes it  obvious (at least it bas made it obvious to me since the fall of 
1952) that the piecemeal technique of pure analytic philosophy cannot yield a 
view of the total complex structure of morality. l want to underscore that I 
value not only the detailed and slow-motion analysis of concepts, but I also 
value the descriptions of linguistic usage that ordinary language philosophy has 
produced. The formett does provide philosophical illumination, and the latter 
constitute proto-philosophical data that must be taken into account. But the 
architecture of the moral edifice requires a synthetic contemplation, the putting 
together of the different elements of morality in their master design. The 
analysis of the different concepts that enter in the moral edifice are valuable, 
but they will be fully illuminating only when they are placed, not against each 
other in the spurious competition that the reductionistic views forces upon them, 
and that has dominated the dialectics of the last decades, but together in 
their proper positions in the total pattern. 
From the preceding preliminary examination of morality,, and further obser­
vations that anybody can make, we can distill the proto-philosophical criteria, 
listed below, of adequacy for any philosophical theory of morality-or social 
morality, if you wish. Naturally, the criteria of adequacy are vague. Their role 
is not to constitute an analysis or theory of morality-since the theory is 
precisely the outcome of the investigation. 'Their role is to demarcate some 
boundaries of the future theory. Several of the criteria allow, because of their 
vagueness, of different interpretations, and a few of them may appear at the 
proto-philosophical stage to be in conflict. 'lhe different interpretations and the 
different ways of solving the apparent conflicts is part and parcel of the problem 
of theorization. A theory has to organize and illuminate the data; it cannot be a 
logical consequence of the data. A theory is a posit, and several theories can be 
posited. 'The testing of a philosophical theory proceeds in two directions: on the 
one hand, it must illuminate, and account for, the initial data; on the other hand, 
it must be able to accommodate and illuminate additional data. Here is another 
juncture at which most of the moral philosophizing, of both old and recent 
past, has been dominated by the prejudice of oversimplification, namely, 
oversimplification of the initial data. This is indeed the third major error 
perennially committed throughout the history of moral philosophy. 
Here is a moderately complex set of data that any theory of morality has to 
consider, illuminate, and conform with. 
I. Morality is a huge system of propositions that includes: (a) the facts of a 
segment of the world inhabited by a causally closed domain of agents; (b) the 
laws of nature that apply to that segment of the world; (c) normative prin­
ciples that prescribe courses of actions. 'That js,, morality is a huge system of 
rules together with their empirical and nomological grounds. 
2. Morality is, thus, universal in that it applies to all the agents of a causally 
closed domain. 
3. Morality is pervasive in that it allows judgment upon all the actions of each 
agent of a closed domain. 
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4. A moral rule is a proposition built upon the propositional matrix "X ought 
to do A/' or "X is required by morality to do A," where: (i) the deontic 
expressions 'ought' and 'is required' have the general normative meaning, and 
(ii) 'morally' and 'by morality' signal the special features or qualifications 
that make a moral rule moral. 
5. Hence, a total theory of morality includes both a theory of the meaning 
of the adverb 'morally' and a theory of the meaning of the matrix "X 
ought'-to do A." The special theory of morality is the theory of the contri­
bution to the truth conditions of moral rules made by the qualification 
morally. 
6. The moral rules are of several types: (a) some moral rules prescribe actions 
in private transactions between members of the same causally closed domain, 
regardless of their having (other) institutional relationships or not; (b) some 
moral rules sanction t�e (non-moral) obligations or duties determined by all 
other institutions; (c) some moral rules demand the changing of the person­
ality of an agent; (d) others require the alteration or the destruction of the 
institutions of a given community; (e) others urge the modification of the 
moral outlook of a given community within a closed domain. 
7. A moral system of rules has in some sense a higher character than that of 
any other normative system. In the first place, it is more comprehensive i.e., 
that the class of acts that fall under morality is larger than the class pertaining 
to any other normative system, including the total legal system of a commu­
nity. In the second place, the other normative systems may be or are 
criticized from a moral or ethical point of view. A bill is declared just, or 
unjust; a practice is fair, or unfair; an institution can be immoral; the rules of 
a game may be said to be unfair, etc. 
8. In some sense (to be elucidated by a theory) the higher character of 
morality is connected with a superiority of ends. Morality has something to 
do with the highest ends and basic needs of the agents of each closed domain. 
9. Happiness is, or is connected with, the highest ends of men. But it is a part 
of morality that there is or may be a conflict between our personal happiness 
and our moral duties. Moreover, from the moral point of view, in this con· 
flict duty is stronger; so that mora1ity includes the demand of some measure 
of self-sacrifice. 
10. Notwithstanding, there is a limit beyond which morality cannot require 
self-sacrifice . .  
11. In spite of the fact that morality is  in some way concerned with men's 
ends, it is not the function of morality to prescribe the means that are 
adequate for the achievement of men's highest ends. Nor does morality pre­
scribe ends. Rather, morality's subject matter is both the organization of an 
agent's ends and the harmonization of all agents' highest ends. Morality iis con­
cerned with some supreme limits of human freedom to take up ends. 
12. Thus, there is a sense in which the moral norms are, in Kant's term, not 
genuinely hypothetical imperatives prescribing the means to attain given 
ends. They do not, pace Socrates and Plato, prescribe the means for happiness. 
But moral rules are not categorical imperaiives in Kant's sense-since they 
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need not prescribe anything binding on a rational agent just because he is 
rational. This is a datum resulting from our keeping fast to the independence 
of the questions "What is morality?" and "Why should one be moral?" 
13. Motives are related to ends. There is a sense in which morality requires the 
absence of desire or inclination in the doing of one's duty. 
14. Morality is a social affair. Indeed, the self-sacrifice required by morality 
is always in reference to someone else's interest. The conflict between one's 
own happiness and one's duty is related to a conflict between one's own and 
someone else's interest or good. 
15. Morality provides a general and neutral point of view from which all con­
flicts among agents can have a solution. This does not rule out the principle 
that in some cases an Im.partial lottery may be used to solve a given conflict. 
16. The moral consideration of everybody's interest is such that in some 
sense, as Bentham put it, everybody is to count for one and nobody for more 
than one. And as Kant added: morality bestows upon each agent a dignity, 
rather than a price: the life and the highest ends of an agent are not morally 
substitutable by the life or the ends of another agent. 
17. Morality provides a point of view from which issue solutions to all 
possible conflicts of (non-moral) duties an agent may encounter because of his 
membership in several institutions. 
18. Morality provides also a perspective from which issue solutions to the 
possible conflicts between institutional duties morally sanctioned, and moral 
duties pertaining to private relationships. 
19. Morality is at least partially within human reach. In some sense CJUght 
implies can; particularly, ought:morally implies can. 
20. As a special case of the above, it is possible for the agent to know what 
his concrete duties ai;e on many given occasions. Morality prescribes for all: 
for the super-intelligent and for the·mediocre, for the knowledgeable about 
the ways of the world and for the not so well informed. 
21. There can be such thing as moral progress. 
22. Morality sometimes may demand the stimulation of moral progress. 
5. Practical Thinking in General 
Criteria 4, 5, and 12 stand in diametric opposition to the views of many 
philosophers of the past, and of many of the present. I have no time to engage 
in detailed criticism of any philosopher, but I do hope that some of the young 
philosophers in the audience will be motivated enough to produce fully detailed 
conclusive and illuminating studies on what I earlier called the first major error 
in the history of moral philosophy. I want now to point out that the complexity 
I am defending, namely, that morality comes through the study of the adverb 
'morally' in 'X ought morally to do A', is more serious than what it may appear 
at first sight. Evidently, adverbial entities are derivative, and the theories about 
these presuppose, so to speak, the theories of the verbal and substantival 
entities on which they depend. Thus, first, as against Prichard and Kant, for 
instance, morality is what the adverb 'morally' expresses, signals, denotes (I 
don't care which semantical terminology you want to use), and not a special 
meaning of the word 'ought.' (Isn't it obvious, really, that morality is what 
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'morally' expresses, not what 'ought' means?) Second, the sentential matrix 
'X ought-to do A' within which our adverb belongs is a complex matrix. It 
has an auxiliary or modal verb, 'ought', which applies to the matrix 'X . . .  - to 
do A.' What this matrix expresses is the atomic unit of content for practical 
thinking. What the matrix 'X-to do A' expresses I call a practilion. First-person 
practitions, .expressed by 'I-to do A' are intentions; second- and third-person 
practitions I call prescriptions. Thus practitions are the fundamental units of 
practical thin.king, just as propositions are the fundamental units of contmeplative 
thinking. I cannot go into a discussion of practitions here. Fortunately, I have 
done this elsewhere. 3 
My first point at this juncture is this. The separation of the special theory of 
morality from the general theory of practical thinking is absolutely required by 
the nature of the moral rules, as indicated in criteria 4 and 5. My next point is 
this. The theory of morality has simply to accept the complexity required by 
the previous separation of the two layers of theory. Thirdly, there are still 
other complexities. The general theory of the ought structure embedded in 
moral ought principles is itself complex. It includes the special theory of ought 
and the general theory of practitions. Since practical thinking, including moral 
thinking, involves the thinking of duties, permissions, rights, and wrongs in 
relation to circumstances, i.e., to what is actually true in this or that case, 
practical thinking includes or envelopes contemplative thinking. Thus, the theory 
of the ought structure, often called deontic logic or the logic of norms, 
in its more advanced stages the whole of the logic of propositions. 
All those complexities are purely formal. But there are yet other types of 
complexity. Practical thinking whether moral or not, is thinking that has a very 
special, internal causality. Now, the practicality of practic.al thinking must be 
differentiated from the practicality of moral thinking-and the latter must be 
further differentiated from the practicality of the institution of. morality. These 
complexities must be accepted. The oversimplifying telescoping of the practi­
cality (whatever that may be) of (the institution of) morality with the practi­
cality of moral thinking is a serious error. A fllrther egregious error is to confuse 
the practicality of practical thinking whatever its type with the practicality of 
moral thinking . These are the errors that lead to viewing overridingness as the 
characteristic trait of morality. This erroneous view is fostered further by the 
analytic habit, on the one hand, of paying attention to details and not consider­
ing the different systematic structures embedded in a simple moral judgment, 
and, on the other hand, of delaying indefinitely the moment of theorization. 
Consider one example. Kant's brilliant discussion in the Gru ndlegung of 
what he calls respect for the law is one of the most insightful and penetrating 
passages in the whole history of practical philosophy. Every moral philosopher 
ought to know it by heart. Yet is has two crucial errors. First, it attributes the 
internal causality of respect for the law to the moral law. This is an instance of 
the error of confusing practical thinking with moral thinking. Second, the 
passage attributes the internal causality in question to a law, i.e., an ought­
judgment. 'This is correct up to the point that an overriding first-person ought­
judgment involves an intention, i.e., a first-person practitlon. But Kant errs by 
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taking the practicality of ought itself, or of an ought.judgment, as primitive, 
without pushing further and seeing that the primal practicality belongs to 
practitions, especially intentions. This second error is perhaps not so much a 
consequence of Kant's oversimplifying assumptions; but it is the result of 
superficial theorization-or a result of both. Again, I cannot go into a detailed 
discussion of Kant's respect for the law or the practicality of practical thinking. 
But I have said something further about these topics elsewhere. 4 
Fortunately, here we only need the remark that the special theory of the 
qualification morally is to be embedded in the system of theories dealing with 
the ought framework, the practicality of practical thinking, the relationships 
between propositions and practitions, etc. In particular, we shall lay it down as a 
fundamental principle that each system of moral rules has the general structure 
studied by deontic logic-and I mean a complex deontic propositional­
practitional structure. 5 
6. The Theory of Morality: A System of Systems 
One of my oldest philosophical ideas is that the complexity of morality , just 
partially represented by the criteria listed above, can only be accounted for by a 
theory built upon the theoretical thesis that: 
(M*) Morality (or, if you wish, the institution of social morality) is a system 
of systems, some of which are themselves supersystems of norms, each 
of the systems being moral by some peculiar feature of its own. 
(M*) highlights the contrast between my non-reductionist respect for whatever 
complexity reality of a concept J,?Ossess and the reductionistic assumption of 
simplicity characteristic of most moral philosophers. Some of the systems 
mentioned in (M*) I already knew twenty-five years ago. The passing of time 
has not weakened my respect for complexity, but has in fact reinforced it. 
Reductionism of the mental to the physical is still running rampant, but, on the 
whole, in the last two decades we have seen the fall of many reductionisms. In 
the case of morality, we have seen the blind alleys into which some moral 
reductionisms have been withering. 
The most important systems included in the supersystem of morality are 
these: 
(A) 
(B) 
A system of principles of actions that govern (otherwise) non·institution· 
al relationships between any two agents. I call it the euergetical systems, 
from the Greek word euergeteo meaning to show kindness, to do 
good. Here belong rules like, "It is wrong to kill a man, except in 
self-defense," practitions like "Don't cause pain for the sole purpose 
of enjoying the sight of pain behavior," and "Always treat others as 
ends in themselves." The euergetical principles are generally vague, 
since they are to fill in the private interstices between institutional 
relationships. Ross 's principlas of prima facie duty belong here. 
A super- institutional system, which I call the ethical system and in­
cludes two components: 
(1) A hierarchical arrangement of all non-moral normative systems 
that demand some actions from some agent in a given community. 
63 
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This arrangement I call an ethos. An ethos ranks all (non-moral) 
institutions of the community in question including all the con­
tracts, agreements, and promises made by each agent. kt insti· 
tution at a given time t is a normative system together with an 
assignment of roles to individuals and objects at time t. 
Promises and agreements are mini-institutions. Each promise is 
by itself a complete normative system. (Here is another juncture 
where the great errors I have been pointing out have consequences: 
the nature of promises has been commonly misunderstood and 
philosophers have spoken of a ·  very mysterious, actually non­
existing, alleged moral duty to keep promises.)6 
(2) A norm establishing the solution of conflicls of duties based on 
institutions by prescribing the ethical obligatoriness of the action 
prescribed by the norm in conflict that comes higher in the 
ethos. 
(C) A schema of the ideal of morality, which includes several departments: 
(1) The syst�m of the general assumptions about moral agency, that 
is, the minimal characterization of an agent i.e., a being capable 
of practical thinking, (whether human or not), for whom moral-
ity prescribes duties. . 
(2) The theory of happiness, that is, the characterization of the 
most formal conditions determining the self-realization value of 
actions. 
(3) The principles of the moral ordering of actions, classes of actions, 
and normative systems. 
(D) The system of the most general guidelines for the creation of moral 
codes, i.e., the most general principles determining, on the adoption of 
certain general assumptions both about the nature of the agents com­
posing the community and about the environment of the community, 
including technological circumstances, the moral outlook of the com­
munity. 
(E) The formal metathetical system. This is a schema of a normative 
system whose norms prescribe the alteration of the moral outlook of 
the community, thus, guiding the moral progress of both the communi­
ty and its members. The change of moral outlook consists primarily of 
a change of the ethos, or of the relationship between the ethical and 
the euergetical systems. 
The preceding outline of the structure of morality is undoubtedly comp1ex. 
But it cannot be faulted for this-or not any more, I hope. Clearly, it conforms 
to the criteria of adequacy gathered above. Hence, if this outline is at all 
faulty-it can only be because it is not complex enough ! Naturally, further 
errors may creep in in the development of each of the five systems ( A)-(E) 
composing morality. 
The five systems of assumptions and principles of action composing the 
institution of (social) morality must be developed. These five subtheories of 
morality are complex, and I will not go into them here. Fortunately, I can 
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refer the audience to a detailed discussion of them The Structure of Morality, 
Chapter 8. 
Here I can discuss only the theory in general terms, hoping that the preceding 
discussion suffices to establish my contention that moral philosophy has really 
too long been suffering under oversimplifying reductionistic prejudices. Now, 
several things must be mentioned about our theory of the nature of morality. 
First, the philosophical theory about the structure of morality can be suffi­
ciently finished even if the full details of some segments, e.g., the system of 
general· assumptions about moral agency, or the assumptions about human 
nature or the environment, cannot ever be formulated in full. Second, the 
philosophical. theory of the structure of morality allows that there be different 
assumptions about the natures of the agents of a certain community or about 
the environment of a community. Thus, the philosophical theory about the 
institution of morality is compatible with there being different moralities, 
each containing its own moral outlook, all being moralities because they con­
form to the same structure. Third, the philosophical theory of morality is 
nonnative in the sense that it provides the schemata of normative principles, and 
also in the sense that it formulates precisely the norms constituting the ethical 
obligation referred to in (B) (2). This obligation is, of course, formal, since the 
philosophical discussion cannot specify any ethos. 'The theory is also normative 
in that it mentions some euergetical principles. 
There is always somebody in every audience listening to a paper in moral 
philosophy who remembers his naturalistic fallacy: that values or rights or 
oughts cannot be derived from facts. The one here today will ask whether I 
am committing the naturalistic fallacy. Well, perhaps. But the naturalistic fallacy, 
like all so-called fallacies, whether formal or informal, is only a principle 
warning to the effect that not aJl arguments of a certain form are valid. Else­
where I have argued that the naturalistic fallacy was born as the marriage of the 
correct idea that deontic logic is not reducible to non-deontic logic, to an 
erroneous oversimplification assumption. I have contended that the unity of 
experience requires in general that there be bridging implications connecting 
the different realms of experience. Thus, there must be bridging implications 
connecting oughts with facts. It is really as simply as that. 7 
Furthermore, the analysis of normative concepts often involves norms or 
norm schemata. Consider the concept chess. Its analysis included the listing of 
the rules of initial position of the chessmen as well as the rules of their move­
ment. Likewise, the analysis of the concept morally, which is much more com­
plex and more normative than the concept chess, clearly has to include some 
norms and norm schemata. 
"But," the questioner may reply, "the rules of chess are not binding on any­
one who does not play, or want to play, chess. Thus, the chess philosopher can 
mention the rules of chess without being bound by them. On the other hand, 
morality is different. Moral rules are binding on everyone. So, you are not 
keeping your philosophical neutrality if you analyze morality in a normative 
way." This is a useful reply, including its questionable part, the one about the 
universal bindingness of morality. Here we find the insinuation that morality is 
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inescapable for a man, for a thinking being. Here we find lurking the first great 
error in the history of philosophy I have been trying to exercise. We simply 
must learn to separate practical thinking and rational practica1 thinking from 
moral thinking. One verbal warning! One can always define 'rational' so that 
moral thinking is implied by rational thinking. But this verbal trick does not 
solve any problems. We must recognize that a being can be rational in the 
original sense of the word : he can think, make good deductions and inductions. 
He can be endowed with the capacity for practica1 thinking besides, and then he 
can be capable of knowing himself well, knowing his environment just as well, 
making decisions and adopting plans, reasoning flawlessly about means and 
ends, and about a11 other matters. In short, he can be a skillful mathematician, 
physicist, chemist, and always succeed in the rea1ization of his predictions and 
the fulfillment of his plans-without adopting mora1ity. Don't call him rational, 
if you don't want to. But at least remember that the structure of morality can be 
understood fully and masterfully described by some such non-rational, or 
irrational, creature. "What is morality?" is an entirely different question from 
"Why should one be moral, i.e., why should one adopt the institution of 
morality?" 
7. Conclusion 
The structure of the institution of (social) morality is very complex. Conse-
quently, the structure of a good natural society, a non-angelic society, �f im­
perfect and finite thinking beings, is very complex. Such society must have 
most of its members concerned both with their own moral development and 
the moral development of their institutions. A good society requires political 
leaders and administrators capable of improving both the lot of the unprivileged 
and the morality of the existing institutions. Doubtlessly, a good society must 
have scientists learning about humankind and about the world, so as to provide 
both better grounds for, and revisions of, the fundamental assumptions of the 
institution of moraJity. But it must have also leaders capable of understanding 
when and how a moral code ought to be changed, as wen as sotne members 
capable of teaching the needed moral changes to the rest of society. 
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